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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILL BROWN REALTY, INC., 
Plaintiff-
Appellant , 
vs . 
LEAH N. ABBOTT, 
Defendant-
Respondent . 
Case No. 14,649 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc., hereinafter Appellant, sued 
Leah N. Abbott, hereinafter Respondent, for a real estate 
commission. The claim was based solely on rights allegedly 
acquired under a real estate listing contract giving the 
Appellant an exclusive right to sell during a three-month 
period. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard by the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County. At the 
pre-trial conference, the Court concluded that there were no 
disputed issues of fact and instructed counsel for both parties 
to submit Motions for Summary Judgment. Based upon the memoranda 
filed in support of those motions, the Court concluded that the 
listing contract had expired by its own terms prior to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sale of the property by the owner herself. The Court there-
fore granted the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial 
court was correct and should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Leah N. Abbott was the owner of a home located 
at 2730 Arapahoe, Provo, Utah. On April 25, 1975, she listed 
the home for sale with Bill Brown Realty, Inc. under the induce-
ments of one Mrs. Malone, a salesperson for Appellant. 
The listing contract which was furnished by the broker 
consists of a standard-form one-page card. The top half is 
filled in with information about the property, and the bottom 
half recites the "Sales Agency Contract". 
Both the top and bottom portions of the document 
recited the listing date as April 25, 1975. The top half 
gives the expiration date as July 25, 1975. An expiration 
time is also given in the bottom half, which reads in pertinent 
part as follows: 
In consideration of your agreement to list 
the property described in this contract, and 
to use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser 
therefor, I/we hereby grant you for the period 
of 3 (number in handwriting) months from 
date thereof the exclusive right to sell, 
exchange or lease said property or any part 
thereof, at the price and terms stated hereon, 
or at such other price or terms to which I/we 
may agree. 
-2-
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At the time she signed the listing agreement, Respon-
dent was told that she could get out of the listing agreement 
before the expiration date without any trouble if she so 
desired. Shortly thereafter, Respondent did desire to termi-
nate the agency contract. She was dissatisfied with what she 
felt to be wholly inadequate efforts to sell her house, and 
she wanted to sell the house herself or at least list it with 
someone else who might give her better service. 
On June 20, 1975, Respondent went to the broker's 
office and signed another standard-form agreement, which she 
was told was a release. She thought that ten days later she 
ould be again free to do with her property as she wished. w 
She was not given a copy of the document when she signed it 
Only later did she realize that she had further obligated 
herself to pay Appellant a commission. That document is 
exhibit "B" of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
reads as follows: *i o /"^ * / 
.tl^$^~v,~06,.&tl Sl^. 
Member of Utah County Board of R e a l t o r / ^ ' ' 
Gent lemen: In consideration of your, agreement to remove the listing of my property located 
^^2J^l4o^^±^^
 from fne f;(e$ of fhe MulMpU L;$f;ng 
S r * V L - e ' .*L"J f h ° . o f f l c e s < b e , o n 9 ' n g f o toe Mult iple Listing Service, effective 10 days from 6»\* 
of th»s withdrawal notice, and the further agreement on your part to withhold your efforts to 
secure a buyer for said property; I agree that if said property is sold I will pay your commission 
at required under terms of the Listing Contract . R.E.B. No . XLL/ 
Dated .1 (fJ^*- * ^ - _/^/-_ 
Accepted : 
£ op o. _. r _^ , 19 ?£ 
Approved by 
DATE C -'Z3'?S' 
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Upon learning that she might still be obligated to 
pay a commission until the end of the original listing agree-
ment, Respondent was reluctant to enter into a contract of 
sale during that period. However, she continued to show 
the property to prospective buyers. Among her other efforts 
to sell the property, she held an "Open House11 on the prop-
erty on July 23, 1975. On that date she first met one Harry 
R. Nord, who was one of the prospects who viewed the house. 
He returned two days later and on July 25, after some nego-
tiations, signed an Earnest Money Agreement and a check for 
$5,000.00. The Agreement recites a sales price of $57,000.00. 
During the following week, Respondent obtained ap-
proval of the transaction from her two daughters, who also 
owned an interest in the property. On August 1, 1975, the 
sale was closed and the deed from Respondent and her daughters 
to Mr. Nord and his wife was delivered and recorded. That 
deed had been prepared in advance in blank for the convenience 
of the sellers. .,.,,,. 
On several occasions, through letters and conver-
sations, Respondent indicated to Appellant and/or his agent 
that she understood that on July 25, 1975, the listing would 
be expired and she would be able to sell the property her-
self without having to pay a commission. On none of these 
occasions did Appellant or his agent attempt to correct her 
or take a contrary position. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT. 
The Appellant has the burden of proving by a clear 
preponderance of the evidence that the trial court's findings 
and judgment are erroneous. The Supreme Court will review 
the evidence and all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in the light favorable to the trial court's findings and 
judgment. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 29 Utah2d 
421, 511P.2d 145 (1973). As the Court stated in Del Porto 
v. Nicolo, 27 Utah2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972): 
. . .it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of the 
trial court, in close proximity to the parties 
and witnesses, there is indulged a presumption 
of correctness of his findings and judgment, 
with the burden upon the appellant to show 
they were in error; and where the evidence is 
in conflict we do not upset his findings merely 
because we may have reviewed the matter differ-
ently, but do so only if the evidence clearly 
preponderates against them. 
This standard is made even clearer by Crockett v. 
Nish, 106 Utah 241, 147 P.2d 853 (1944). There the court 
stated: 
. . .if (after reviewing the case) we are in 
doubt or even if there be a slight preponder-
ance in our minds against the trial court's 
conclusions we will affirm. 
Other jurisdictions have a standard at least this 
stringent. For example, where a trial court resolved con-
flicting evidence in favor of the defendant in an action to 
-5-
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cancel a deed, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered itself 
bound thereby. Westover v. Harris, 137 P.2d 771, 774 (N.M. 
1943). 
Since in this case both parties submitted Motions 
for Summary Judgment, the trial court does not view the evi-
dence in light favorable to one party or the other. But 
even if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to Appellant, the result is the same. The only factual issue 
was the date of the sale of the property, and that is not in 
dispute. Neither party contends that the sale took place 
before July 25, 1975. The only statements regarding that point 
are in the affidavits which state, as reiterated in the Appel-
lant's brief, that the property was shown and inspected on 
the 23rd day of July. Appellant does not contend that that 
amounts to a sale entitling him to a commission. Therefore, 
there is no factual issue in dispute and the case was prop-
erly disposed of by summary judgment. 
II. APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION 
BECAUSE THE LISTING AGREEMENT HAD EXPIRED 
BEFORE THE SALE TOOK PLACE. 
On the morning of April 25, 1975, Respondent entered 
into an exclusive real estate listing agreement with the Appel-
lant. That agreement was to be in force ". . .for the period 
of 3 months from date thereof. . .[number written in ink].11 
At issue here is whether that agreement was still in force on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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July 25, 1975. This issue is resolved in favor of Respondent 
by a proper counting of the days included in the contract. 
This Court gave a lucid and unequivocal explanation 
of the proper way to count the days in a matter such as this 
in Brennan v. Lynch, 123 Utah 57, 254 P.2d 454 (1953): 
. . .a month commences at the beginning of the 
day of the month on which it starts and ends at 
the expiration of the day before the same day 
of the next month. . .. If the month in question 
commenced on a day other than on the first day 
of such month, such as at the beginning of the 
23rd day of such month, it would end at the 
expiration of the 22nd day of the next month 
and not at the expiration of the 23rd day of 
the next month, which would be the beginning 
of another month. 
A calendar month is defined in 74 Am.Jur.2d Time, §9, 
at 593, as the period of time running from the beginning of 
a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corre-
sponding numbered day of the next month. 
Appellant cites authorities to the effect that the 
first day of a specified period should be excluded and the 
last day included. All those authorities are inapposite to 
the present case because they would exclude the first day 
of the listing period. It is clear that if Appellant had 
produced a buyer who on April 25 had been ready, willing and 
able to buy the listed property at the price recited in the 
listing agreement, he would have been entitled to a commission, 
It is so improbable as to be ludicrous that he would not claim 
a commission, and, if everything else were in order, would 
-7-
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receive it. Therefore, the first day that the contract was 
in force, and hence the first day included in the calculation 
of the time, was April 25. The last day of the third month 
from that day was July 24. July 25 was the first day of the 
fourth month. Ergo, there was no listing agreement in force 
on July 25. 
Appellant contends that Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure excludes the first day of the contract and, 
due to the fact that July 24 is a legal holiday, adds an addi-
tional day to the contract, extending it to July 25. However, 
Rule 6 is not applicable here. Rule 6 is expressly limited 
to 
. . .any period of time prescribed or allowed 
by these rules, by the local rules of any 
district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute. . .(U.R.C.P., Rule 6 (a)). 
Appellant argues that Rule 6 does apply because in 
Utah a real estate broker has a statutory right to sue for 
a commission. That is beside the point. Rule 6 applies to 
periods of time prescribed by statutes, et al. This case 
does not involve any statute of limitations or other period 
of time prescribed by statute. And the period of this listing 
agreement was not prescribed or allowed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, by the local rules of any district court, by 
order of court, or by any statute. Rule 6 is a procedural 
rule for the purposes of the courts of law and does not govern 
contracts between private parties. 
-8-
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Appellant reads an error into Judge Bullock's decision 
below in that the original Ruling, entered April 15, 1976, stat 
that the ". . . Agreement had expired on July 25, 1975 . . ..", 
whereas the Minute Entry dated May 28, 1976, says that ". . . t 
Court is still of the opinion that the exclusive listing agree-
ment expired by its terms at Midnight July 24, 1975, prior to 
the sale of the property . . . ." 
There is really no discrepancy here. At one time the 
Court said that on July 25 there was no agreement because it ha 
expired. He later clarified it for Appellant by specifying the 
time at which it expired--midnight July 24. The Court meant th 
same thing both times, and that is made clear in the transcript 
on file. 
A word is in order here concerning Respondent's reli-
ance on the three-month limitation in the contract. It is 
based on the following reasoning: There is an ambiguity in 
the contract as to the expiration time. (One manifestation of 
that ambiguity is the fact that Appellant and Respondent under 
stood and treated it differently.) Since both mentions of the 
time limit were expressly written in, neither is given prefer-
ence in the construction of the contract. Therefore, the rule 
to be followed is that an ambiguity in the contract must be 
construed against the broker. Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 
235 P.2d 510 (1950); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts, §§275 and 276, 
at 688. This is especially true where the broker furnishes 
-9-
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the form and he (or his agent) fills in the blanks. 
E. M. Boerke, Inc., v. Williams, 28 Wis.2d 627, 137 
N.W.2d 489 (1965), involved an ambiguity relating to the time 
of a real estate listing contract. In that case, the agree-
ment was to continue in force "until January 15, 1957,f. The 
court found that the word "until" was an ambiguous term. It 
left unclear whether or not January 15 was to be included. 
The broker fulfilled the terms of the contract on January 15. 
The court construed the ambiguity against the broker, held 
that the contract ended on January 14, and denied recovery. 
The contract in the present case was to remain in 
force ". . .for a period of 3__ months from [April 25]. . .". 
"The word 'from1 when used with respect to measurement of time 
has no fixed or specific meaning; standing alone it is ambigu-
ous and equivocal." 74 Am.Jur.2d Time, §21, at 605. It is 
to be construed as a term of inclusion or exclusion according 
to> inter alia, the equities of the particular case. Id. 
The equities of the present case are discussed below. 
III. BEFORE THE SALE TOOK PLACE, RESPONDENT 
WAS RELEASED FROM HER OBLIGATION TO PAY 
A COMMISSION. 
Appellant contends that he is entitled to a commission 
because the sale took place within six months of the expiration 
of the listing, to someone who saw the property during the term 
of the listing. That is unsound. First of all, the owner 
-10-
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procured the buyer herself long after the borker had openly 
and intentionally ceased all efforts to secure a buyer, and 
had so indicated in a signed writing. Therefore, the findin 
of the buyer could not be attributed to the broker's efforts 
Furthermore, the release agreement, Exhibit ?IB" 
inserted above, limits Respondent's liability for a commis-
sion. Although it is difficult to discern the meaning of 
that document from its face, we must assume it was intended 
to have some operative effect between the parties, or they 
would not have executed it. Appellant contents that it furt 
obligates Respondent to pay a commission under the listing 
contract. But the consideration recited is the removal of 
the property from the Multiple Listing Service and the with-
holding of the broker's efforts to secure a buyer. That 
cannot be viewed as adequate consideration for a further 
obligation to pay a sales commission. Therefore, the 
document must have some other meaning. 
A reasonable cons truetion of that agreement would be 
that if the property is sold during the ten days before the 
withdrawal becomes effective, the owner will pay the commis-
sion as required under the contract. In other words, if the 
broker happens to produce a buyer before the property is 
removed from the Multiple Listing Service and before the 
newspaper ads run out, he still gets a commission. But that 
is the end of the obligation. 
-11-
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This Court may choose to give the document some other 
reasonable interpretation, such as that it terminates the six-
month post-expiration clause in the listing agreement, or that 
it changes the agreement to an "exclusive agency" as opposed 
to an "exclusive right to sell". But it challenges credulity 
to believe that it could serve to reinforce the owner's obli-
gation to pay a commission in return for the broker withhold-
ing all his services. 
IV. THE CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY 
CLEARLY FAVOR A VERDICT FOR RESPONDENT 
AND AGAINST APPELLANT. 
A. Appellant should be estopped from claiming that 
a contract was in force on July 25, 1975. 
Respondent was led by Appellant and/or his agent(s) 
to believe that they considered, as did Respondent, that the 
listing agreement would not be in force after the end of the 
day on July 24, 1975. 
Respondent prepared a letter advertising her property 
and stating the terms of sale, and distributed copies to numer-
ous people in the area. In that letter, a copy of which was 
sent to Mrs. Malone, Respondent clearly stated her understanding 
that after July 24 the realtor would not be entitled to a com-
mission. Both the broker and the agent remained silent on 
the point, and Respondent justifiably relied on the acquiescence 
implied by that silence. 
-12-
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In addition, in a telephone conversation that took 
place on July 24 between Respondent and the listing agent, 
Respondent again stated that it was her understanding that 
the listing terminated on that date and that she would be 
free to dispose of her property, without having to pay a 
commission, on the following day, July 25. The agent did 
not contradict her or give notice in any way that the real 
estate company took a different view. 
Appellant is now estopped from asserting that the 
contract was to be In force on July 25, or that he is entitled 
to a commission on the sale that took place on that date. 
Respondent justifiably relied on the implied representations 
of the Appellant and/or his agent. To allow Appellant to 
recover under this set of circumstances would be a serious 
miscarriageofjustice. 
B. Appellant is not entitled to a commission because 
he did not use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser. 
Appellant did not fulfill his part of the contract. 
The agreement requires that the broker must use reasonable 
efforts to find a purchaser. This he did not do. 
In the first place, the broker did not furnish the 
ultimate buyer. He did not present an offer nor does he allege 
that he did. 
Secondly, Appellant's performance under the contract 
was feeble and inadequate. It fell far below Respondent's 
-13-
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reasonable expectations. According to Respondent's Affidavit, 
the home was advertised in a local newspaper only twice in two 
months. There was no open house held by the broker. Neither 
the broker nor his agents showed the home to a prospect. Nothing 
was done by the broker beyond placing the two advertisements, 
placing the card on the Multiple Listing Service, and placing 
a "For Sale" sign on the property. Surely this cannot be held 
to constitute reasonable efforts, as required by the listing 
agreement. Therefore, since the Appellant has not fulfilled 
his obligation under the contract, he cannot be allowed to 
recover. 
C. A real estate broker should be held to a standard 
of "best efforts" when he secures an exclusive listing contract. 
Respondent recognizes that an exclusive listing (that 
is, a listing giving the broker an "exclusive right to sell") 
entitles the broker to a commission if the property is sold 
within the period of the listing, whether through the efforts 
of that broker or completely independant of his efforts. The 
rule is restated in Lewis v. Dahl, 180 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362 
(1945), and Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 (1963). 
See also 160 A.L.R. 1040 and cases cited therein. 
The general rule stated in these cases was formulated 
to prevent an unscrupulous property owner from reaping a harvest 
from the broker?s efforts. It protects the legitimate, consci-
entious broker and makes it more difficult for a devious owner 
-14-
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to cheat him out of his rightful earnings. This is cited as 
the justification for the rule, Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah 
216, 257 P.2d 944 (1953), and in that context it rests on 
sound principle. 
However, Respondent contends that the rule is un-
sound when it is used against a property owner. Specifically, 
the rule should not apply unless the broker has used his best 
efforts to find a purchaser. If carried beyond those limits, 
the rule allows an unethical or inefficient broker to sit idle 
once he has secured a listing and let the exasperated owner 
or another broker earn his commission for him, with little or 
no effort on the part of the listing broker. This unfairness 
is exacerbated by the fact that the use of the exclusive listing 
is standard business practice among realtors, and the unin-
formed or overly trusting public is not in a good position to 
bargain for a different arrangement. 
The inequities are clearly evident when the rule is 
viewed in light of the facts of this case. Respondent reason-
ably expected prompt, adequate and effective action from the 
broker, in return for her relinquishment of the right to deal 
freely with her own property without the liability for a 
commission. When Respondent finally took over from the broker 
and conducted a vigorous promotional campaign, she found many 
interested and qualified prospects. This is precisely what 
she had expected the broker to do. The Appellant holds himself 
out to the public as an expert in his field, and charges a 
commission for his services. Had he exerted the same effort 
-15-
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as Respondent did, there is good reason to believe he would 
have been at least as effective as the owner herself was in 
procuring a purchaser. 
The broker or his agent asked for two reductions 
in the listing price. The property was originally listed 
at a price of $61,500.00, as is shown in the listing contract, 
Exhibit "A" of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Appellant first asked for a reduction on the sales price to 
$59,500.00 to which Respondent agreed. The second request 
was made on June 20. Respondent was asked to reduce the price 
to $55,000.00, which is $6,500.00 below the original listing 
price. Apparently, Appellant grossly miscalculated the fair 
market value of defendant's property. This reduction is not 
even within reason, especially in light of plaintiff's meager 
efforts to sell the property. 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion, the 
rule allowing a broker to collect a commission under an exclu-
sive listing agreement for a sale within the listing period, 
regardless of who was the procuring cause of the sale, should 
be modified. The rule should allow an owner to defeat a 
broker's claim under an exclusive listing contract if it can 
be shown that the broker has had a reasonable time in which 
to fulfill his obligation under the contract, and that he 
has not exerted his "best efforts" in finding a purchaser. 
The broker should be held to this higher standard when he 
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is granted an exclusive right to sell. The fiduciary obli-
gation of a broker to his principal already requires this 
high standard of loyalty and effort, but it should be made 
more explicit. It should be written into the contract. A 
property owner gives up a valuable and important right when 
he signs an exclusive listing contract, and should be entitled 
to a broker's best efforts in return. Such a standard is 
more just and fair, and will serve to strengthen the confidence 
of the public in the real estate broker. 
CONCLUSION 
The whole question here is whether Appellant earned a 
commission from Mrs. Abbott. The lower court found that he 
did not. On July 25, 1976, the undisputed date of the sale, 
Appellant had nothing but an expired contract. He had agreed 
to withhold his efforts to sell the property as of the end of 
the previous month, hence he was not entitled to a commission 
on a sale to someone who saw the property thereafter. He did 
not have a contract to rely on when the property was sold. He 
did not earn a commission. It would be patently unfair to 
allow him to recover one. 
The trial court's judgment is presumed correct. It 
is not clearly erroneous; it is clearly correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of October, 1976 
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